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the Florida courts-one case involving un-
dercover police informers and another in-
volving relocated government witnesses.
All were allowed to testify without the
presence of TV cameras. Certainly the po-
tential harm to the privacy interests of the
individual will have to be considered in
this area.
The momentum for increased court-
room television coverage is gathering.
What might evolve is a new standard for
how much the public is entitled to know
and how much the individual is entitled to
conceal. In any event, the time is probably
not too distant when the home viewer will
watch justice dispensed from the comfort
of his armchair.
Recent Decisions
MARYLAND AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Technology
and the
Environment:
NEPA Strikes
a Balance
by John Jeffrey Ross
Until recently, only a minority has
quarrelled with the rampant expansion of
technology in this country. Applied
science has produced both rapid economic
growth and an enviable standard of living
for a substantial number of people.
Because economic and governmental
progress depend heavily on man's facility
to alter and control his macrocosm, tech-
nology enjoys a favored status in our
culture.
However, the carefree exploitation of
human and natural resources through
technological progress is not without its
antagonists. For example, the pervasive
influence of a scientific ideology in educa-
tion and the social sciences draws critic-
ism from those fearful of the dehumaniza-
tion of the art of teaching and the study of
man's behavior; other commentators de-
cry the "alienation" of workers in indus-
try that has been subject to extensive
technological influence.'
The progress of the "new industrial
revolution" has had a particularly strong
impact on the environment. The applica-
tion of human expertise to man's sur-
roundings entails for many an environ-
mental crisis. As one writer notes:
The new pessimism toward technology
and its role in society can thus be
traced to two major realizations: The
first is that modern technology faces us
with grave threats to our lives, to our
health and to our ability to enjoy our
surroundings, and to our liberties, and
these threats now weigh heavily against
the unmistakable blessings technology
has made possible. Second, there is lit-
tle room for hope that these threats can
be countered either quickly or easily...
J. G. Speth, The Federal Role in Tech-
nology Assessment and Control, in
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 422 (E. Dolgin
and T. Guilbert ed. 1974).
Although technology in itself need not
be inimical to the well-being of man and
his environment, its deployment often has
been accompanied by the use of unsound
judgment and ignorance of its potential
harm to the ecology of which man is a
part. The essential task facing environ-
mentalists, then, is to provide information
It has been suggested that intensive concentration of
technology in the workplace alienates the laborer
from his work product, as well as increasing social
stratification with the emergence of special interest
groups tied to the use of technology (such as "tech-
nocrats"). See H. Lefebvre, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
MARX 196 (1969). Alienation, in the political sense,
describes a loss of control over the means of prod
uction. Commentators note the lack of an active, in-
terested involvement by workers in industry with a
high concentration of technology. "Technological
factors are paramount also in their impact on self-
estrangement, since the machine system largely
decides whether the worker can become directly
engrossed in the activity of work or whether detach-
ment and monotony more commonly result." R.
Blauner, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM 8 (1964)•
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as to the danger of misapplied technology,
to raise the consciousness of "environ-
mental protection," and to vindicate a
conservationist philosophy in the courts
and through legislation.
TECHNOLOGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A significant challenge to the unwise
use of technology has been offered
through congressional action by the
passage of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §4321 et.
seq.). NEPA underscores, as a matter of
national policy, the recognition of the
"profound impact of man's activity" on
the ecology. Section 2, 42 U.S.C. §4321,
declares the purpose of this law to be:
The declaration of national policy
which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and
his environment; to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage
to the environment and biosphere and
stimulate the health and welfare of
man; to enrich the understanding of the
ecological systems and natural
resources important to the nation.
The balance of litigation under NEPA
which reflects the technology/
conservation dichotomy rests on the
statute's requirement that all significant
developmental activities in which the
federal government is either directly or,
through funding, indirectly involved be
subject to strict scrutiny and evaluation.
42 U.S.C. §4332 (2). This examination of
federal action entails the preparation and
assessment of environmental impact
studies pursuant to the need to predict
and control the technological growth pro-
cess.
A recent case which reflects the bifur-
cation of conservation and technology in-
terests is National Wildlife Federation v.
Andrus, 440 F.Supp. 1245 (D.D.C.
1977). The Andrus plaintiffs, members of
various environmental groups, challenged
a federal energy project approved by the
Department of the Interior which would
place a 23 megawatt power plant at the
Navajo Dam on the San Juan River in
New Mexico. Although the proposed
power project was eminently mer-
itorious,2 the conservationists intervened
The beneficiaries are Native Americans of the Nava
jo nation.
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to protect one of the country's best trout
fisheries and the interests of other wildlife
whose fortunes were tied to the condition
of the San Juan River.
In 1962, Congress authorized the
Navajo Indian Irrigation Project (NIIP),
P.L. 87-843, 43 U.S.C. §§615ii et. seq.,
to provide 110,630 acres of arable land
for the Navajo nation in New Mexico. 3 To
generate power for irrigation, Congress
sanctioned the construction of a 15
megawatt powerplant on a tributary of the
San Juan River. Page 1248 of 440
F.Supp.
In 1966, the Department of the Interior
reevaluated the project and recommended
that land more suitable for irrigation and
NIIP purposes be substituted for some of
the acreage in the original tract. Pursuant
to this, Congress amended the NIIP in
1970, P.L. 91-416, to reflect changes in
NIIP land composition as recommended
by the Department. Although government
documents discussed the placement of an
irrigation energy source at a different site
to coincide with the 1970 rearrangement
of NIIP land, Congress granted no statuto-
ry approval for a powerplant other than
that authorized in 1962. See 43 U.S.C.
§§615ii-615yy; 620.
THE NAVAJO DAM ENERGY FACILITY
Despite the lack of statutory approval,
the Department of the Interior planned
the development of a 23 megawatt
powerplant at the Navajo Dam and
purchased $3.6 million worth of energy
equipment to furnish it. The Department
proposed this activity as a service to the
NIIP project as well as "other non-NIIP
power demands." 440 F.Supp. at
1248-1249.
In opposing the project, the National
Wildlife Federation urged the Interior
The NIIP represents a step forward for the Navajos.
In addition to advancing that nation's agrarian in-
terests, developing industry-related power demands
might be quenched by energy provided through NIIP
facilities, See M. Price and G. Weatherford, Indian
Water Rights in Theory and Practice: Navajo Ex-
perience in the Colorado River Basin, 40 Law and
Contemp. Problems 97, 120, 126 n.2, 128 (1976).
See generally, R. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of
the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27
Stan.L.Rev. 1213 (1974).
The NIIP is a participating project of the Colorado
River Storage Project. See S. Rep. No. 363, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
Department to consider in detail the en-
vironmental consequences of a 23
megawatt design on the San Juan and
possible alternatives to its construction.
Unable to admit its expenditure was pre-
mature, the government rejected any
alternate considerations and proceeded
with the original plan; the environmental
advocates sought relief in the United
States District Court for the District of
Columbia.
Their complaint followed three theo-
ries: First, the Interior Department's pro-
ject on the San Juan River was lawless;
Second, the government failed to comply
with the disclosure mandate of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act; Finally,
the government also violated the congres-
sional reporting requirement of the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§662 et. seq. 440 F.Supp. at 1255.
In order to justify its project in the ab-
sence of express statutory authorization,
the government relied on the "mention"
of a powerplant at the Navajo Dam in a
1969 Senate Report on the NIIP amend-
ments. S.Rep. No. 363, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. at 2. Moreover, claimed the govern-
ment, this report followed similar com-
ment on NIIP energy alternatives pre-
sented to a House subcommittee in 1966;
thus, a powerplant on the San Juan River
at Navajo Dam was what Congress envi-
sioned when it rearranged the NIIP land
area in 1970. This argument failed to sur
vive because no articulable congressional
intent on the contested energy site
emerged from the legislative history.
Further, because of the absence of specific
statutory sanction, the government was
precluded from proceeding with the
powerplant. Id. at 1249.
Failing to show that reference to a pro-
ject in congressional documents is
equivalent to public law, the government
pursued the theory of "legislation by ap-
propriation" to demonstrate that agency
"wishful thinking" can blossom into con-
gressional sanction as long as you can get
Congress to foot the bill. In answer to pro-
posals to fund legalNlIP endeavors, Con-
gress had approved necessary grants for
their maintenance. In addition to legiti-
mate requests for NIIP appropriations
were inconspicuous references to the
Navajo Dam powerplant. The defendants
argued that because Congress did not dis-
allow these added petitions, it in effect
demonstrated approval of the powerplant
"by appropriation."
Unawed by this sleight of hand, the
court noted that the burden does not rest
with Congress to scrutinize every pro-
posal to determine the legality of federal
agency action. Moreover, the record failed
to show that there was sufficient congres-
sional awareness of the 23 megawatt pro-
ject to support the "legislation by ap-
propriation" sought by the government
defendants. Finally, the court stated
agreement with established case law in
the District of Columbia Circuit which
holds that "Congress does not legislate
through the appropriations process." 440
F.Supp. at 1250; Atchison, Topeka and
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Callaway, 382
F.Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1974). See D.C.
Federation of Civic Ass'ns v. Airis, 129
U.S. App. D.C. 125, 391 F.2d 478
(1968).
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH FWCA
The plaintiffs claimed, and the court
agreed, that the Department of the In-
terior failed to conform to section 662(b)
of the Federal Wildlife Coordination Act,
16 U.S.C. §§661 et seq., by neglecting to
submit a report to Congress on the conse-
quences of an energy site at the Navajo
Dam. This mandate, a complement to the
disclosure requirement of the National
Environmental Policy Act, provides Con-
gress with sufficient data on a project
affecting fish and wildlife to allow the nec-
essary remedial conservation legislation.
The government unsuccessfully defended
its disregard for this important congres-
sional reporting obligation by arguing
that it had already released necessary in-
formation pursuant to NEPA's section
102(2)(C). In light of the court's finding
that the information requirements of
NEPA and FWCA are not redundant, and,
considering the important status of
equality which fish and wildlife enjoy vis-
a-vis development projects, the govern-
ment's circumvention of the FWCA effec-
tively ruined its case. 440 F.Supp. at
1254. See T. Guilbert, Wildlife Preserva-
tion Under Federal Law, in FEDERAL EN
VIRONMENTAL LAW 555 (E. Dolger and T.
Guilbert ed. 1974).
THE NEPA REQUIREMENTS
The central issue of Andrus is the
failure by the Interior Department to com-
ply with the disclosure requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Act.
Had the bona fides of the agency been ar-
ticulated through a cogent, informative
environmental impact statement (EIS),
the conclusive effects of other errors in
the government's case may have been
mitigated.
As stated earlier, the key provision of
NEPA, and one often litigated, is Section
102, 42 U.S.C. §4332, which commands
strict compliance with the Act. An
especially clear mandate is §102(2)(C),
which states, insofar as is pertinent:
all agencies of the federal government
shall... (C) include in every recommen-
dation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed state-
ment.. .on
(i) the environmental impact of the
proposed action,
ii) any adverse environmental
effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed ac-
tion[.]
NEPA §102(2)(c)(i)-(iii), 42 U.S.C.
§4332(2)(C)(i)-(iii). See F.R. Anderson,
NEPA IN THECOURTS 
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-55 (1973).
The role of the EIS becomes in
creasingly important when conservation
and technology conflict, and for any sig-
nificant project it serves as a point of
departure for an interdisciplinary con-
sideration of ideas and proposals repre-
senting both interests. The reasoned
assessment of an activity's environmental
consequences serves to control overreach-
ing technology. "Congress did not estab-
lish environmental protection as an ex-
clusive goal; rather, it desired a reorder-
ing of priorities, so that environmental
costs and benefits will assume their proper
place along with other considerations."
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v.
Atomic Energy Commission, 146
U.S.App.D.C. 33, 36, 449 F.2d 1109,
1112 (1971). As the Ninth Circuit notes,
"failure to follow this [EIS] procedure cre-
ates a risk that serious and unavoidable
consequences of the action, which the EIS
would reveal, will not be brought to the
attention of agency decision- makers."
City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661,
670 (1975). See Jones v. District of Col-
umbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 162
U.S.App. D.C. 366, 376, 499 F.2d 502,
512 (1974). See generally, Note, Public
Participation in the Environmental Im-
pact Statement Process, 61 MINN. L. REV.
363, 365-366 (1977); A.J. Cerchione
and A.M. Black, Planning: A Com-
munications Process in PLANNING, ENVIRON
MENTAL SCIENCE, AVIATION (J.J. Yannacone,
Jr. ed. 1974).
In their first attack on the adequacy of
the Government's Environmental Impact
Statement, the Andrus plaintiffs argued
that the Interior Department failed to
demonstrate the necessarily elaborate
consideration of the powerplant's conse-
quences. The court concurred with the
plaintiffs' allegation and commented at
440 F.Supp. 1252:
As these excerpts from the [final en-
vironmental statement] indicate, defen-
dents concede that there will be an
effect on the fish and wildlife below the
dam, but they give no details as to what
that effect may be. The many
references to future studies which will
determine later the environmental im-
pact of the powerplant reflect the fact
that defendents have yet to make the
sort of probing examination which is
required by NEPA. (emphasis added).
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Because NEPA commands that the
Government should study environmental
effects prior to commencing a project, the
fragmented impact analysis proposed by
the Department of Interior for each stage
of its project at the Navajo Dam failed to
pass statutory analysis. According to the
District of Columbia Circuit, "NEPA's
purpose was to break the cycle
of... incremental decision-making," and
an agency must consider environmental
effects of the entire proposed action at its
initial planning stage. Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC), 178 U.S.App. D.C.
336, 342, 547 F.2d 633, 639 (1976),
rev'd. on other grounds. Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 46
U.S.L.W. 4301.
Andrus presents an analogous situation
where the Department of the Interior pro-
posed a cursory and piecemeal inspection
of the ecological consequences of a major
federal action. Avoiding a thorough en-
vironmental assessment of the project at
the initial planning stage means that sub-
sequent decisions during later stages of a
project will be unduly influenced by the
irretrievable commitment of resources.
Furthermore, the isolation of issues as
they arise in the ongoing progress of a
project's development ignores the impact
of the project as a whole. In other words,
the NEPA command to examine the en-
vironmental impact of a major Federal ac-
tion necessarily entails an impact assess-
ment before the powerplant is translated
from idea to project. Andrus, ante at
1251 1252. The impact of EIS prepara-
tion on the use of technology is most for
midible at the planning stage.
Closely related to the failure by the
Department of the Interior properly to ex-
amine the Navajo Dam energy facility was
the refusal "adequately to address the
comments of various interested parties,
including several governmental agencies
which were critical of [the envronmental
impact statement the Department
issued]." This course of action by the de-
fendents was also condemned by the
court. Id. at 1252-1253. Cf. W. Rogers,
Jr., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 729-730 (1977)
("The environmental impact statement
thus serves not only to give notice of en-
vironmental consequences but also to
verify the genuiness of the decision-mak-
ing process. The document should show
who was consulted, what they said, and
the agency's response.")
In order to minimize adverse environ-
mental consequences of a project or use of
a technology, a federal agency should en-
tertain courses of action other than its
own proposal. Section 102(2)(E) required
the Interior Department to "study,
develop, and describe appropriate alterna-
tives," to its version of the 23 megawatt
Navajo Dam powerplant. Pursuant to this,
the plaintiff environmentalists urged the
government to examine other sources or
less environmentally obnoxious means of
obtaining power for the irrigation project.
In addition, the Department was asked at
least to suspend construction pending
more extensive environmental studies.
Noting that the Department of the In-
terior reviewed only two alternatives pro-
posed by "other interested parties," and
both in a conclusory and perfunctory
manner, the court found that the defen
dents once again acted contrary to NEPA.
Pages 1253-1254 of 440 F. Supp. Citing
Monroe County Conservation Council v.
Volpe, 472 F.2d. 693 at 697-698 (2d Cir.
1972), the court reasoned that the search
for viable alternatives is "the linchpin of
the entire impact statement." Id. Indeed,
"[a] sound construction of NEPA ... re-
quires a presentation of the environmental
risks incident to reasonable alternative
courses of action." Natural Resources
Defense Council v. Morton, 148 U.S.
App. D.C. 5, 12, 458 F.2d 827, 834
(1972).
CONCLUSION
It might appear that environmental pro-
tection as a constraint on technology does
not occur without cost. In National
Wildlife Federation v. Andrus, the defen-
dents also enjoyed an important consti-
tuency: the Navajo Indians who would
benefit from the energy facility which was
the subject of this litigation. However, the
concept "environmental" must be under
stood to transcend the traditional view of
"trees, wildlife and open space" to in-
clude the concern for the human ecology.
The very essence of the need for a
reasoned analysis of any project (which, a
fortiori, involves massive doses of tech-
nology), is the belief that the adverse
effects of any collision of the needs to
develop, conserve resources, maintain
clean air and water, and to protect
population interests can be lessened by
the use of reason in the decision-making
process. Environmental impact study may
be required for socio-economic effects
and urban construction as well as for dams
and highways. The logical end of environ-
mental protection is not the death of tech-
nology, but the rebirth of technology as a
vital resource for the benefit of man and
his life space.
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